

Event-B for Safety Analysis of Critical Systems

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
Contents

Motivation

Functional Model for MoRC


Safety Activities with Rodin

Conclusion



1 2

1. http://www.disputeabout.eu/dwn/1003/25767en_USI_enlargementmapsm.jpg
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European Train Control System (ETCS) Specification (ERA)

- ▶ Facilitation of Cross-Border Trains
- ▶ Data Transfer over Wireless Technique (GPRS)
- ▶ Goal : Homogenization of Train Signalling (up to $500 \frac{km}{h}$)

Challenge : Informal Specification with room for interpretation. Very different detail level (requirements, implementation detail, notes etc.)

openETCS

Aims at providing a formal model, open proof and open source toolchain for ETCS.

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Overview

- ▶ Functional Model for Management of Radio Communication (MoRC)
- ▶ Safety Activities with Rodin
- ▶ Conclusion

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Conclusion

Management of Radio Communication

- ▶ Participants
 - ▶ On-Board Units (OBU)
 - ▶ Radio Infill Units (RIU)
 - ▶ Radio Block Centers (RBC)
- ▶ Section §3.5 of ETCS spec
 - ▶ Initiate, Maintain and Terminate Radio Communication
- ▶ Critical Function : Radio Communication for Movement Authority / Speed Limits

Event-B Model for MoRC

- ▶ Type *entities*
 - ▶ partitioned into set of OBU, RIU and RBC entities
- ▶ State of Communication
 - ▶ Communication direction (incoming, outgoing)
 - ▶ Protocol stage for each communication session



Event-B Machine Refinement

- ▶ Machine 0 - *Basic Communication*
- ▶ Machine 1 - *Directional Communication*
- ▶ Machine 2 - *Limit to OBU viewpoint*
- ▶ Machine 3 - *System Level Compatibility*
- ▶ Machine 4 - *Level Changes Support*
- ▶ Machine 5 - *Safe Radio Communication*

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
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Safety Support with Event-B



Safety Requirements

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)

Hazard

“Exceeding the safe speed or distance as advised to ETCS.”

- ▶ **REQ_FMEA_ID_005** If a communication with trackside equipment is active, set-up of safe radio connection with another trackside equipment mustn't beformed. Exception in case of handover with RBC.
- ▶ **REQ_FMEA_ID_007** Establishment of communication session shall be performed when no communication is active. Exception in case of handover with RBC.

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Integration into Model

- ▶ Machine 3
 - ▶ Establish additional connection only with RBC for hand-over
- ▶ Machine 6 - *Explicit hand-over RBC*
 - ▶ Refine set *establish_ER_connections* with one variable
 - ▶ Refine set *ER_connections* with two variables
 - ▶ Invariants to show size limitations and correct hand-over with RBC

Validation

- ▶ Establish communication with on-track equipment
- ▶ Establish hand-over with two RBCs
- ▶ Terminate and re-establish a communication session

Val

The screenshot displays the Rodin IDE interface for a counter example. The main window shows the **State** view for the **LTL Counter-Example**. The state table lists various variables and their current and previous values.

Name	Value	Previous value
accepting	●	●
terminating_sessions	●	{c_RBC01}
contacted	●	●
contacted_by	{c_RBC02}	{c_RBC02}
incoming_sessions	●	●
outgoing_sessions	●	{c_RBC01}
m6_hand_over_RBC	●	●
comm_partner	entities5	c_RBC01
comm_partner_defined	FALSE	TRUE
establish_partner	entities5	entities5
establish_partner_defined	FALSE	FALSE
hand_over_defined	FALSE	FALSE
hand_over_partner	entities5	entities5
signal_RBC_border	FALSE	FALSE
terminated_EPL_connections	●	●
current_level	L2	L2
current_status	SOM	SOM
position_radio_hole	FALSE	FALSE
signal_level_change	FALSE	FALSE
signal_manual_level_change	FALSE	FALSE
signal_mode_change	FALSE	FALSE
signal_radio_hole	FALSE	FALSE
accepting	●	●
terminating_sessions	●	{c_RBC01}
contacted	●	●
contacted_by	{c_RBC02}	{c_RBC02}
incoming_sessions	●	●
outgoing_sessions	●	{c_RBC01}
Formulas		
invariants	T	T
axioms	T	T
thename (on constant)		
Invariant ok	No event errors detected	

The **Event-B Explorer** on the left shows a tree view of the model components, with **m6_hand_over_RBC** selected. The **History** view on the right shows a sequence of events and their parameters.

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- ▶ Provides strong link of the model to the specification
- ▶ Importance of Traceability of Requirements
- ▶ Possibility to validate the Intended Behavior (Functional and Risk Mitigation)

Questions

Collaboration / Diffs on models ?

Animation of decomposed models ?

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