



Project Allocation with Event-B and ProB

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Rodin Workshop 2025 (10/06/2025)

Context



- ► Annual allocation of students (Year 3, MSc) to supervisors.
- ► Challenges:
 - Growing student number
 - Multiple student per staff
 - Matching students to relevant projects
 - Staff loading constraints
 - Load balancing

Student's View of the Process



- Select preferences from a list of topics
 - Up to 12 choices
 - Choices from different supervisors
- Allocated to a supervisor
- Most of students got a supervisor from their chosen list.

Issue

- Allocation software is no longer maintained
- Performance detoriated when
 - New programmes are added
 - Cohort's size increases
- Manual allocation required

Aims



Formal Model

- Precisely specify the algorithm
- "Executable" for allocation
- Adaptable to future changes in the allocation process.
- ▶ (Not a focus): Proving the consistency of the algorithm

Requirements for Project Allocation



The assumptions (1/2)

ASM 1	There is a finite set of programmes	
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ASM 2	There is a finite set of students	
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ASM 3	There is a finite set of staff
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Requirements for Project Allocation



The assumptions (2/2)

ASM 4	Each student is associated with a programme
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ASM 5	Each staff is associated with a set of programmes
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ASM 6	Students have a preference ranking (without duplication) of the supervisors
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ASM 7	Each staff has a maximum number of students that they can supervise
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Requirements for Project Allocation



The requirements

REQ 8	A successful allocation must ensure that every student is allocated to a supervisor
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REQ 9	A student's programme must match one of the supervisor's indicatedprogrammes
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REQ 10	If a student has some preferences, then the allocated supervisor must be on their preference list
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The Formal Context



1	sets

- 2 PROGRAMME STAFF STUDENT
- 3 constants
- 4 student_programme
- 5 staff_programmes
- 6 student_preferences
- 7 staff_limit
- 8 axioms
- 9 @axm1: finite(PROGRAMME) // ASM1
- 10 @axm2: finite(STUDENT) // ASM2
- 11 @axm3: finite(STAFF) // ASM3
- 12 @axm4: student_programme \in STUDENT \rightarrow PROGRAMME // ASM4
- 13 @axm5: staff_programmes \in STAFF \leftrightarrow PROGRAMME
- 14 @axm6: dom(staff_programmes)=STAFF // ASM5
- 15 @axm7: student_preferences \in STUDENT \rightarrow (STAFF \rightarrow 7 N) // ASM6
- 16 @axm8: staff_limit \in STAFF \rightarrow N // ASM7

One-Shot Specification



```
event allocate
     any allocation
2
     where
3
       @grd1: allocation \in STUDENT \rightarrow STAFF // REQ8
4
5
       @grd2: \student student programme(student)
6
           ∈ staff_programmes[{allocation(student)}] // REQ9
7
8
       @grd3: \forallstudent · student preferences(student) \neq \emptyset \Rightarrow
9
           allocation(student) ∈ dom(student preferences(student)) // REO10
10
       (grd4: \forallstaff · card(allocation \triangleright {staff}) < staff limit(staff) // REQ11
12
     end
13
```




finishGreedyAllocation Successfull finishNoPreferenceAllocation	
finiahSwappingAllocation	Unsuccessful
GreedyAllocation	unsuccessfulAllocation
INITIALISATION Proposing continueWithSwappingAllocation SwappingAllocation continueWithNoPreferenceAllocation	NoPreferenceAllocation
changeToAccepting changeToProposing	
decline Accepting accept swap	allocate_without_preferences

- ► Early stop if all students are allocated.
- Can be unsucessful
- No load balancing at the moment

Greedy Allocation Stage






- Variant of "College Admission" algorithm (Gale and Shapley [1962]).
- Alternating between proposing and accepting
- Optimise the student preferences






finishNoPreferenceAllocation



- Reallocate an allocated student to a different staff
- Allocate the supervisor to a new student
- Increase the number of allocated students.
- Trade off the student preferences.

No Preferences Allocation






- Allocated students without preferences to staff
- Increase the number of allocated students.

Tooling





- 244 MSc Students in 12 programmes
- 134 staff, each with a limit of 3 students
- 236 students allocated in Greedy Allocation Stage
- ► 5 students allocated in Swapping Allocation Stage
- 3 students allocated in No Preferences Allocation Stage
- Project Allocation is done 2 weeks early (compared to last year).

Conclusion



Summary

- ► We can "execute" formal specification
- Bottle-neck: Rodin analyses the conrete context.

What's Next

- ▶ By pass Rodin to generate ProB Standalone input directly.
- Add load balancing
- Update the algorithm to deal with topic choice
- Add properties (as invariants) for the algorithms
- Study other allocation problems/algorithms
- Define Language to specify algorithms (PlusCal-like for Event-B)



David Gale and Lloyd S. Shapley. College admissions and the stability of marriage. The American Mathematical Monthly, 69(1): 9–15, January 1962. URL http: //www.jstor.org/stable/2312726?origin=JSTOR-pdf.